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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 10-3673 
_____________ 
 
OLIVIA A. ADAMS,  
                           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JAMES MURRAY LYNN, (Individually and in his capacity as a Court of Common Pleas 
Judge in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania);  
THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY;  
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA;  
THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-05908) 
District Judge: Honorable Louis H. Pollak 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 19, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
 
. 
(Opinion Filed: March 30, 2012 )                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge
 Frustrated with the results of several state-court litigations, plaintiff Olivia Adams 
filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking declaratory 
. 
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judgments and injunctions against Judge James Murray Lynn of the Court of Common 
Pleas Philadelphia County, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.  The gist of her 
complaint is that Judge Lynn and the Court of Common Pleas have denied her relief to 
which she is entitled.  Specifically, Adams, an African American, alleges that Judge Lynn 
has refused to enforce an order entered in one of the state-court cases because of her race.  
The District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and subsequently denied 
Adams’s motion for reconsideration.  We will affirm. 
I. 
This case arises out of a real estate contract dispute between Adams, Craigg Real 
Estate Investment Corporation, and Patrick Charles.  In August 2001, Adams brought a 
quiet-title suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against defendants 
Craigg and Charles regarding several properties in Philadelphia.  The parties eventually 
agreed that the property known as 2212 Watkins Street was to be sold, with Craigg 
receiving $3,000, and the remainder of the proceeds being equally divided between 
Adams and Charles.  Upon learning that Craigg and Charles had sold 2212 Watkins 
Street for $70,000, Adams asked the court to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds 
of the sale.  In May 2007, Judge Lynn issued an order stating that Adams was due 50% of 
the proceeds of the sale, but declined to impose a constructive trust on those proceeds.   
Adams and the defendants both appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.  
On June 23, 2008, the Superior Court remanded the case to Judge Lynn with instructions 
to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of the sale.  Adams alleges that, on 
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remand, rather than imposing a constructive trust, Judge Lynn instead held a settlement 
conference in which Judge Pro Tem Vincent Melchiorre pressured her to settle the 
litigation against Craigg and Charles and a related suit against their attorney, Thomas F. 
Grady.  Adams alleges that Judge Pro Tem Melchiorre told her, “there are groups.  There 
are Italian Lawyers, Jewish Lawyers, Black Lawyers and Irish Lawyers,” and that Judge 
Pro Tem Melchiorre went on to state that “Judge Lynn would not allow [Adams] to take 
[Grady] down like that.” 
Ultimately, however, Judge Lynn issued an order, dated August 6, 2008, that 
specified that the proceeds of the sale were to be held in a constructive trust and 
appointed a receiver for the amount of $30,500.  Adams argued that this arrangement 
violated the Superior Court’s order to create a constructive trust and filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which Judge Lynn denied.  Adams then filed in the Superior Court a 
motion to enforce the Superior Court’s June 23, 2008 order.  The Superior Court denied 
Adams’s motion, concluding that Judge Lynn’s August 6, 2008 order fulfilled its earlier 
directions and that Adams had received the remedy she requested.  The Superior Court 
stated, further, that, if Adams wanted to challenge the August 6, 2008 order, she should 
have appealed that order rather than filing a motion to enforce the Superior Court’s June 
23, 2008 order.  It also noted that the time to file such an appeal under the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Appellate Procedure had lapsed.  Adams’s motion for reconsideration was 
subsequently denied, as was her application for relief in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  
Adams also filed a motion for recusal against Judge Lynn, which remains pending. 
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After her motions were denied by the Pennsylvania courts, Adams sued Judge 
Lynn, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  She sought (1) a declaratory judgment that she 
is entitled to the imposition of a constructive trust on the full $70,000 proceeds from the 
Watkins Street property sale, (2) a declaratory judgment that the Pennsylvania courts 
violated her due process rights, (3) an order directing the Court of Commons Pleas to 
hold a hearing to determine her share of proceeds of the sale of the Watkins Street 
property, and (4) a mandatory injunction requiring Judge Lynn to act within ten days of 
the District Court’s order.  Adams later sought permission to file an amended complaint, 
in which she asked the District Court to enforce, rather than modify, the August 6, 2008 
order by issuing a declaratory judgment “that the Court of Common Pleas is required to 
promptly provide Plaintiff access to the remedy set forth in its own August [6], 2008 
Order by immediately complying with the terms set forth therein” and an “injunction 
directing Judge James Murray Lynn . . . to move on the August [6], 2008 Order within 
thirty . . . days of this Court’s decree.” 
Citing the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine, the District Court granted 
defendants’ motion to dismiss Adams’s original complaint, denied as futile Adams’s 
motion for leave to amend her complaint, and dismissed the case with prejudice.  Adams 
then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied based on both the 
Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines.  Adams filed this timely appeal. 
 
5 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over Adams’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Adams has 
not asked us to review the District Court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to 
the claims in her original complaint.  Instead, she has repeatedly stressed that the question 
here is whether she can proceed on the claims asserted in her proposed amended 
complaint, which the District Court dismissed as precluded under either Rooker-Feldman 
or Younger.  Because the defendants have admitted on appeal that the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine does not apply to plaintiffs’ amended claims, we will analyze only the Younger 
aspect of the District Court’s decision.  We “exercise plenary review over the legal 
determinations of whether the requirements for Younger abstention have been met”; “if 
so, we review the district court’s decision to abstain for abuse of discretion.”  FOCUS v. 
Allegheny Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 843 (3d Cir. 1996).   
The District Court did not err in abstaining from adjudicating Adams’s proposed 
amended complaint under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).  Younger 
abstention “reflects a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending 
state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.”  Gwynedd Props., Inc. v. 
Lower Gwynedd Twp., 970 F.2d 1195, 1200 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  A district court may abstain on Younger grounds when three conditions are 
met: (1) there are pending or ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the state proceedings 
implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate 
opportunity to raise any constitutional issues.  See O’Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 
F.3d 785, 789 (3d Cir. 1994).   
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The District Court correctly found that the three prerequisites for Younger 
abstention were satisfied in this case.  First, Adams admits that her state-court case 
remains open.  Indeed, the relief she seeks — an injunction ordering Judge Lynn to take 
further action on his August 6, 2008 order — presupposes that the Court of Common 
Pleas retains jurisdiction to act in her case.  Second, the United States Supreme Court has 
held that “the special interest that a state has in enforcing the orders and judgments of its 
courts” satisfies the second prong of the test.  Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 109 (3d Cir. 
1989) (interpreting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987)).  Because Adams’s 
proposed amended complaint plainly seeks enforcement of the Court of Common Pleas’ 
August 6, 2008 order, that interest is implicated in this case.   
Third, Adams has not satisfied her burden to show that the state proceedings do 
not afford her any opportunity to raise her federal claims.  See id. at 107 (quoting 
Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14).  “‘[W]hen a litigant has not attempted to present [her] federal 
claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal court should assume that state 
procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to 
the contrary.’”  O’Neill, 32 F.3d at 792 (quoting Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 15).  Adams has 
not alleged that she has raised her federal claims or sought enforcement of the August 6, 
2008 order in the state courts; nor has she cited any unambiguous authority that would 
preclude her from doing so.1
                                              
1  As discussed above, Adams filed a “motion to enforce” the Superior Court’s June 23, 
2008 order, but she has not alleged that she has taken any action to request enforcement 
of the Common Pleas Court’s August 6, 2008 order or initiated contempt proceedings 
against the state-court defendants for failing to comply with that order.   
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We acknowledge that, even where the three Younger abstention predicates are 
satisfied, a plaintiff can avoid abstention by making a “showing of bad faith, harassment 
or some other extraordinary circumstance.”  Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 418 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  In a different case, we might conclude that Adams’s race-discrimination 
allegations, which we take very seriously, constitute such an “extraordinary 
circumstance” and warrant federal-court review.  But in this case, where Adams asks a 
federal court to enforce a state-court order (which, despite the alleged prejudice, was 
decided in her favor), but has not asked the state court to enforce that order, such a 
conclusion would be premature.   
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
ruling that Younger abstention precludes federal-court litigation of the claims presented 
in Adams’s proposed amended complaint. 
III. 
Therefore, we will affirm the judgment dismissing Adams’s claims and denying 
Adams’s motion for reconsideration.    
 
